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SPACE-AGE EUROPE, 1957-1980 
Walter A. McDougalI 
"Europe will be made in space . . . or not at dl!" 
Orio Giarini 
"I1 nc faut pas cspCrcr pour entrcprcndrc ni reussir pour p c k c r . "  
William thc Silent 
Soon after the Soviet Sp~mz.4 opened the frontier of outer space, 
European scientists. industrialists, and politkans began to clamor for 
rapid entry into the space age by Europe, the cradle of modem 
technology. It took 22 years before the European Space Agency ('ESA), on 
Christmas Eve 1979. finally achieved successful orbit of a European- 
designed spacecraft riding on a European booster, the Arkne, from its 
equatorial spaceport in French Guiana. The launch was beamed live (via 
the American-built Intelsat IV communications satellite) to French televi- 
sion. But the viewers-and the newsmen themselves-were so unused to 
such &airs that each time the countdown went on another "hold" they 
reacted hysterically as if the whole program were about to be cancelled. 
This calls to mind another anecdote from a friend who watched the 
coverage of the first Moon landing in 1969 in the company of a peasant 
family in the South of France. They were curiously bl& about the whole 
affair-until the report that President Nixon was about to converse with 
the astronauts on t!ie Moon. Madame excitedly called the family to watch: 
"Look! The President of the United States, he is going to telephone the 
Moon . . . and we cannot even get a line to Paris!" 
In these vignettes are illustrated essential themes in the first chapter 
of space-age Europe: tardy and hesitant enthusiasm, a certain naiveti, 
and public apathy to events that do nor impingc on quotidian reality. In 
tired Europe, the age of adventure sometimes seems closed, but it is 
perhaps enough that there is a European chapter in space at all. In fact, 
the response of the major states to the challenges of Sputnih and Apollo 
reflect their very adjustment to the postwar world itself, a world in which 
the old continent struggles tc find its p rops  place amidst superpower 
hegemony, decolonization, welfare statism, fitful integration, and, above 
all, perpetual technological revolution. 
The first European implications of SputniR were military. Now that 
the Soviets demonstrated m intercontinental ballistic missile capability to 
threaten the American homeland, was the U.S. nuclear deterrent still 
credible? Would America risk New York or Chicago to save Berlin or 
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Paris? And if not, could xcond-rank powers like Britain or France see to 
their own defense? Only six months h e r  Spatnih. Charles DcGaulle was 
called out of retirement to lead a nation smarting from Dien Bicn Phu, 
Suez. and Algeria. His "certdine i&e" of a glorious France rested not 
only on rhetoric, but on a vision of technological xlf-sufficiency in 
defense and industry. In five years. French R&D spcnding increased four- 
fold, yielding a vigorous nuclear power program, zz indepcndcnt 
strategic deterrent, and the world's space program. Benefiting from its 
country's military missile research, the French space agency "cut" a series 
of precious stones- rockets called the Agate, Topaze. Rubis-until in 
1965, a Diamant launcher lifted a French satellite into orbit from the 
Sahara dcscrt test range. There also followed the deployment of land- and 
submarine-based missiles. the Force de Frappe. and in our own day, the 
beginnings of a military space program. 
The French could not hope to match the space and missile efforts of 
the U.S. and USSR. But that was never their intent. Militarily, the French 
relied on the crude "city-busting" deterrence of the mutual-assured- 
destruction doctrine. In terms of general technology, they envisioned a 
world of multipolar competition in which Europe would evolve away from 
both Cold War camps. What was important. therefore. was that France 
assure herself the position of first among European equals. The French 
space program would help to establish French primacy in the European 
community. 
The British, on the other hand, reacted to Sputnik by throwing in 
the towel. Their V-bomber force would soon be obsolete, but they aban- 
doned their missile effort and resigned themselves to dependence on their 
"special relationship" with the U.S.-the relationship that DeGaulle so 
despised. But lest their first-generation intermediate-range ballistic 
missile go to waste, the British offered the rocket, the Blue Streak. to 
Europe as a whole, to serve as the first stage of a European space booster. 
Meanwhile, an international committee of xientists organized by Pierre 
Auger lobbied governments on behalf of a spacc science program. From 
these two early initiatives the European spacc program emerged. 
dedicated to admitting European science and industry to this latest and 
most exciting human enterprise. 
It seemed like a good idea at the time. France, Italy, West Germany, 
and the Bcnelux countries had just formed the Common Market and 
EURATOM. A cooperative space effort was a logical stp I. Morever, the 
vast expense involved suggested the pooling of resourcr So in the early 
1960s. the European Space Research Organization (ESRc *nd the Euro- 
pean Launch Development Organization (ELDO) were born. The two 
agencies became embarassing examples of how not to generate high 
technology. 
ESRO's r ember countries* pmT0m3e-c! to desiga payloads f a  satellites 
to be hunched by NASA and eventually by EELDO. But thank to 
organizational problems. inexgerieace. md underfunding, it was not un- 
til 1967 that the erpcrimend ESRO 1 was in orbit. By that time Britain 
and I d y  were already pleading stnitcned fmanca while dl member 
governments were goading ESRO to dcemphasize science in favor of com- 
mercial applications satellita with benefits perrcptiblc to parliaments and 
publics. ESRO founded some impressive facilities ir. its early yeus, e.g., 
the spacecraft design laboratory at Noordwijk, Netherlands; a Europcan 
space operations center in Darmstadt, West Germany; ground stations in 
Spain, Bclgium, and Italy; and a sounding rocket range m Kiruna, 
Sweden-but there were endless startup problems associated with them. 
Discord also stemmed from disproportional distribution of contracts to 
the member states, the problem of j u s k  retour. France, for instance 
received a percentage of ESRO contracts twice the level of her contribu- 
tions, and less favored nations complaincd that such practice only 
perpetuated their industrial inferiority. This pointed up a grievous prob- 
km with cooperative R&D: cff~cicncy demands that contracts go to the 
most qualified bidder, but politics demand "?ffmative action" for less 
experienced firms in countries hoping to play "technological catch-up." 
Either the poor help to subsidize the rich, or the rich subsidize mediocrity 
ir! the short run and new competition in the long run 
While ESRO sthlgglerl. TLD0 futled. It had projected a European 
booster coasisting of the Blue Streak as first stage, a French-built second 
stage, a German third (or apogcc) stage, and an Itaiian ta t  satellite. 
Anyone familiar wich the difficulties of systems interface in the American 
program can imagine the boondoggle of an international rocket. By 1969, 
the Europa booster had gone through numerous daign changes, had 
never flown, and was 350 percent over initid budget. Veterans of those 
days have written positively impolite accounts of their cxpericnces with 
foreign colleagua. One of the more tolerant was this depiction of na- 
tional temperaments: "Whenever we faced a technical or administrative 
problem requiring improvisatioti, the French would stubbornly refuse to 
violate my hard-won principle of procedure; the Germans would endorsc 
Eklgium. Dcnmuk. Fnncc. G r m a n y  (West). Italy. Netherlands. Spain. Swcdcn. Switzcrlmd. and 
rhc United Kingdom. Austria and Norway had obxrvcr srarus. 
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the principle, then list dl conceivab:e exceptions; the Italians would ex- 
citedly urge re-negotiation of the principle to accomodate the offending 
contingency. while the British would cheerfuhy zcccpt any improvisation 
without question-so long as undct no citcumstanccs would it serve as a 
precedent!" Others complain that Europcan ministries uscd ESRO and 
ELDO as dumping grounds for dcadwood personnel. In any cuc. the 
babble of tongua only exacerbated the habitual lack of communication 
among scientists, engineers. and bureaucrats. 
By the late 13605. the Europcan space effort was a shambles. That it 
persisted was due in part to a second shock wave from abrcnd-the fmt 
had betn the Soviet Sprtnd, the second was America's vigorous reaction 
to SpuhiR. From aboard, America's hcady expansion of the 1!Mk 
xemed to comprise nothing less than a second industrial "takeoff." il- 
lustrated by her space triumphs. booming economic growth, and ubi- 
quitous foreinr cnvcstment. It all xemcd to stem from what one French 
economist d i e d  "the keys of power": government forcefeeding of 
science, technology, education, and investment in "point sectors" of the 
economy, especially aerospace. Americans themselves may never have felt 
entirely comfortable with the massive inc r~sc  in state stimulation of 
economic and social change, but the American model made a profound 
impression on a Europe already inclined toward itattinre. Europcan 
economists and pundits swallowed the arguments of the Kennedy and 
Johnson administrations on behalf of big-government K&D even more 
than we did ourselves. The visionary Apollo program and its technological 
and managerial "fall-out" had xemed to open a vast technology gap be- 
tween the U.S. and Europe. Talented Europeans fled to the advanced 
laboratories of America, causing a "brain drain" that further handi- 
capped European science. It seemed the old industrial and imperial 
powers would face a future of "industrial helotry" if Europe did not 
match the technological surge of the U.S. DcGaulle himself intoned: 
"We must invest constantly, push relentlessly our technology and scien- 
tific research to avoid sinking into a bitter mediocrity and being colonized 
by the invention and capacity of other nations." 
For European business the apparent threat from America, later 
popularized by Jean-Jacques Servan-Schrciber's Le D$i amin'kzn, was 
the best propaganda for higher space budgets. As early as 1961, European 
industrialists had iormed a private lobby callcd EUROSPACE. 
Throughout the 1960s it beat the drum for state-financed R&D, warning 
Europeans apinst their tendency to sniff at the technical ac- 
complishments of boorish Americans whilc taking comfort in their 
superior culture. "Carthage was a flourishing culture," observed the 
president of EUROSPACE, "when it met its doom. And it was not the 
exceptional culturc or eloquence of Rome that all-lved her in turn to resin 
the pressure of barbarians." Rather, "the evolution of all humanity is 
dosely linked to technological progress. . . . If Europe does not regain her 
place in the first rank of technological civilization it will soon be too 
late.", The Germans expressed this as Tonchi1~sspanik: Europe must leap 
now or the door to the space age would slam shut. The Italian govern- 
ment called for a "technological Marshall Plan." in Britain, Harold 
Wil.son proposed a "European Technological Community. " 
These fears and exhortations of the late 1960s proved to be exag- 
gerated. But they seemed to be confiimed at the time by the one profit- 
making enterprise in space applications-Intclsat. This consortium for in- 
ternational telecommunications satellites founded by 19 nrrions in 1964 
was an American show. The U.S. controlled 61 percent of the voting 
authority and all the technology. It was even managed under contract by 
the U.S. Communications Satellite Corporation, which was dominated in 
turn by such giants as American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T). This 
situatics irked the Europeans, but there was no competing with the 
Ameri.:a..s since U.S. export laws forbade sale of launch technology to 
-- 
turope, d~ld NASA was under orders not to provide launch service for 
satellites  at!^ to compete with Intelsat. Here was precisely the sort of 
dependency of which the French always warned. 
- 
A he early 1970s were consequently a confused time of negotiation 
and reorganization for the extant and aspiring space powers. Apollo was 
winding down and the Shuttle being planned. The U.S. invited the Euro- 
peans to cooperate more closely in space while talking compromise on In- 
tetsat 2.nd satellite launch policy. Why should Europe waste millions to 
duplicate American efforts? This was persuasive, but on the other side the 
French continued to campaign for independence, offering to take the lead 
in a reinvigorated European effort. The result was a grand compromise. In 
1975, a new European Space Agency absorbed ESRO and ELDO, drawing 
on their facilities and experience, but dedicated to avoiding their short- 
comings. A new system of a fa carte financing, by which members need 
pay for only the programs they support, and centralized management of 
major programs under a single country, promised both juste retour and 
improved efficiency. European aerospace frrms a h  promoted equitable 
subcotirracting through formation of private international consortia. 
ESA was built around three main projects, all now nearing comple- 
tion, which reflected the compromise between independence and col- 
laboration with the U.S. To Britain went the major role in fundit~g and 
developing the MARECS marine navigation satellite system; West Ger- 
many received major responsibility for the sophisticated Spacelab,* a 
space sciences module custom-made for the cargo bay of the U.S. Shuttle. 
Finally, France chargcd ahead with development of Ariane, a heavy 
satellite launcher capable of boosting communications sat;llites into high 
geosynchronous orbits. Meanwhile, the U.S. relinquished control of In- 
t c h t  in a new, perrfianent convention-and European and Third World 
delegates promptly voted to deny a launch contract to the U.S. and sign 
on with Ariane. 
It would appear at present that Europe h ~ s  finally succeeded in 
fashioning the diplomatic, organizational, and technical prerequisites for 
a sustained, effective space program. European aerospace and electronics 
firms-often bearing worthy risks in light of fickle government policies 
and uncertain markets-have reached state-of-the-art expertise in chosen 
fields. But the future of Europe in space is still far from assured. ESA is 
still troubled by political and economic difficuities, and the central goals 
of European space activity are still unenunciated after 20 years. Both 
Eurospace and ESA's Director-General, E. Quistgaard of Sweden, pressed 
again in 1981 for a plan of space development for the decade of the 1980s. 
As in the p ~ t ,  member governments refused to look beyond immediate 
budgetary cycles or enunciate long-range goals. Funding should continue 
at current levels of about $840 million per year, enough to support an ap- 
proved second launch pad at Kourou, French Guiana, development of 
the improved Ariane 2 and 3, and possibly an experimental Earth 
resources satellite. But new starts are few, and scientific missions like 
Giotto, the gripping rendezvous with Halley 's Comet, are small potatoes. 
h fairness, one must recognize the inability of the U.S., freed of 
multilateral confusion, to draft long-term plans of its own. But as 
Quistgaard laments, all the problems of the individual European govern- 
ments andof the balked process of integration weigh upon those charged 
with getting Europe into space. 
Every member state contributes unique strengths and weaknesses to 
ESA. But the character of the European space propram from its inception 
has been shaped above all by France. ESA stil! lies in the shadow of a 
Gaullist Eur~pe that never happened. Britain never could have led 
Europe into space. Her tired taxpayers and confused bureaucrats wcre 
* Thc primc contractor for Spacelab w u  t::c German furn ERNO, a subsidiary of VNV. Its dwclop- 
mcnt cost w u  $800 million. Thc first operational Spacclab mission, featuring a German utronaut. 
-5 xhcdulcd to ridc thc Shuttle ~n latc 1983. 
most skeptical of plamor~us R&D, had no defense motive, and were of 
two minds a b u t  Eurapean integration. Germany was the founder d 
modern rocketry, but she was barred from missile R&D because of the 
unpieasant ux she made of the V-2. Only France was capable of a gritty 
national effort and of taking the lead in cooperative prodrms. And the 
advent of DeGauL by historical accident in 1958 meant that France's 
mission in Europe, and Europe's in the world, wcre defined in terms ex- 
ceptionally favorable to space activities. Bu: it llso meant that Europe in 
spacc would be stamped with Gault;sm. ELDO and ESRO-instcad of 
helping to forge a united Europe-served instcad to elevate France within 
a Europe in which national prerogatives would be closely guarded and in- 
ternational institutions promoted mostly as a tool against the Anglo- 
Saxons. 
France dominated ESRO and ELDO, and her industries benefited 
most from them. France's cooperation policies with Europe. NASA, or 
the Soviet Union were designed as murh to tap foreign funds and skills for 
the benefit of her own national program as the other way around. It was 
France that led the campaign against dependence on America, even when 
logic may have dictated a division of labor. It was France that bartered her 
indispensable cooperation for ESA's approval of a Franco-European 
launcher and Franco-European communications satellite program. And it 
is France that benefits most today from the prestige, technology, and 
m~l~tarv applications of European spacc research. 
This is not to say that France has exploited others. She has consis- 
tently made the largest contributions to European spacc funds, curreatly 
25 percent. Nor is it to r - 7  +hat France's partners in ESA do not glean 
rewards commensurate 1- ielr participation. Nor is it even clear that 
the Gaullist insistence o* .:h independence was not farsighted, given 
the uncertainties of wor:, politics and power balances over the long run. 
But the fact remains that French space policy has been doggedly na- 
tionalistic, and that the E u r o p ~ ~ n  space establishment-as are all other 
European institutions-is a hostage to that policy. 
What of domestic support for spue activity? Here again, the role of 
Gaullism is critical. To be sure, public opinion has had its cycles, as the 
U.S. European excitement and worry about technological ideriority 
peaked around 1968, and by the early 1970s, Europeans, too, wcre 
beco~inp disenchanted with iechnology as a social panacea. Thus, even a 
ESA r m e  into being, European opinion was cautious on space spending. 
E8! and member governments have sometimes been uncertain what 
posiure is best for the protectio~ of spacc budgets: proud publicity or a 
low profile. Today the chances are good that the man on the street in 
Lyon. not to mention Napla or Liverpool. is scvccly a- of FSA or 
Arianc. 3ut current apathy o ~ g h t  not to obscure the k p  domestic 
significvKt of the spacc don. For the legitimacy of a French or European 
thrust into the cosmos is rooted in the historical cirnunnv~cs of its birch, 
in thc role that ~echnolog) was to play in the stabilization of the Fifth 
Republic. D&uk declved hirnscif a defender of t d i t i o d  France in 
socd rchrions, politics, and cuiturc, cvtn as he d e c d  the cnd of im- 
pend F r v ~ e  (with m a t  from Algeria), the end of Europcvl Fmcc 
(with resistance to fiuther integration), the end of arlvrticist France (w I 
r ' hdrawd from NATO). d the cad of sodis t  F t m  (with dcfcat of 
the Icft). In order to prcsme tradition in the abstnct r& of French 
life, DcGaulle proposed to ovenhrow tradition in the material r d m .  
Technologid revolution m l d  nnd?tc abroad into tht pmtigc and in- 
dependence of French tradition, and at home in the seductive vision of 
the future that invited Frmcc and Europe to irmginc thtmsclves "in the 
ycar 2000," that inexapabie s l o p  of contemporary Europc. 
Hcncc the legitimacy of a Gadlist regime that claimed to play mid- 
wife to the future even as it invoked the past. What DcGaullc actually of- 
fcrcd was a French vcnion ot our own "Republic of Technology," in 
which social and international chakngcs alike arc spirixcd away (in 
thcory) through the genic of the technologid fix; where leaden pasc as 
defenders of tradition even as Ley undcrminc it indirectly through 
tcchnologid revolution. In a Europe that is W y  nonideologid, 
materialistic. and atheistic, this pattern of tcchncuon~ politics is 
discernible not only in France, but cvcrywherc. 
Has high-technology investment rd ly  transformed Europc? This is a 
tough question. given the difficulties of rr.:;suring xcond-order c o w -  
quenccs of R&D. Europevl ~ndustry has certainly escapcd "backwater" 
status. and western Europe is ag&n part of the world tcchnologid 
vanguard. But the dfcct of space activity on Europc must still bc sought 
ir the politid. not cconomic. r d m .  For the Europeans chosc to rejm a 
global division of labor in space, and thus to duplicate many U.S. and 
Soviet achicvcments. And for what? Arianespace. the new commercial 
fm. may show a profit, but only bccausc its R&D costs were absorbed by 
European taxpayen and bccaw its launch price may bc subsidized to 
compete with the Shuttle. In any casc, AA:X~C only matches a capability 
the U.S. had had fcr two decades. As for the goal of industrial prowess. 
European motives were a g l i ~  largely political, as dcmonsuated by the fact 
that European aerospace fums have become xmi-public "chartered com- 
panies" of the state. The recent German union of MBB (Mcscrschrlridt) 
and VFW is only the 1a;m in a series of forced merger, that prtviously 
produced British Aerospace. France's Acrospatde, and Itdy's 
Aerospuiak-dl fm thc purpose of competing. not in capinlisr~. but in 
mercantilirtic fashion. with the g&.t Amcrican firms and with cach other. 
in a business othmise too big for "link" E w p c .  
As the 1980s mature. it b entirely possibk thu cvm the comxntn- 
tivn of rcsourm within cach European sure. cvcn the poding of rcffnurts 
among European stata may not &KC to sustain an indcpcndcnt Euro- 
pcvr role in space without shvply higher Ie-cIs of spending, which in 
turn may prove politically i m p i b k .  E m  at the t w ~  peak of thc 
mid-1960s and late 1970s. Europt spent only a dribkt on space: 0.1 per- 
cent of combincd GNP versus 1.5 percent for the USSR and bctwccn 0.5 
and 1.0 percent for the U.S. In per a p i u  tmns. thc superpmcrs have 
spent 20 t ima more than Europe. As thc U.S. now gtus up for another 
spacc / defense push. and as musabk sp3cecnft. antisatellite weapons, and 
pcrmancnt space stations cmcfgc as mu-tcnn prospea. the future of a 
coherent, independent European space &on is dubious. By around 
1985. with A r h c  w d  Spacelab and MARECS cmpktcd.  the Eumpc?~ 
will w i n  havc to face the question "Vcspacc pcur quoi faire?" Member 
governments may havc to: 
Antc up a considerable investment on a truly multhtcnl basis. im- 
plying unprcccdcnted political unity; 
Continue such programs as ArivK pcrrnio. but othcrwlx accept a 
role of "subcontractor" to the U.S. in the many fields of space a- 
ploitation made possible by the Shutrh; 
Throw in thc towel. cutting back state oqcnditurcs on space and x- 
ccpting a reduced or very diffcrcnt view of the role dwcstcrn Euro- 
pcan states in the world. 
Severe m n o m ~  crisis could force the third course. Otherwise. the 
Frenzh will remain independent and ambitious. The Arncricvls will con- 
tinue to cxtcnd the hand of cooperation. in part to relicvc their own 
budgetary strains. The Germans. whose wealth and cxpcnisc arc atuac- 
tivc, will bc in the middk, wooed by washing to^ and Paris as rhcy were 
in DcGaullc's day. For tt: Shuttle may opcn up a universe of p-sibilitics 
in spacc industrialization. weaponry. ~atellite repair and rccovay, pcn- 
mt manned nations. and more. The Gcnnans in turn wdl be en- 
ticed-and the irony may come to pass that decisions made in Bonn and 
not Paris will finally determine what "Europe in the y c u  2000" will bc 
doing in outer space. Gixini's intuition may won prove valid. that 
"Europe will be made in space . . . or not at all." 
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